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Abstract
A major theme within the literature on rural development is that the particular mix
of formal and informal institutions present in any situation is a key determinant of
development outcomes. However, there is some evidence that in policy and
practice there are considerable difficulties in articulating formal organizational
realities with the rules and norms embedded in informally constructed social
structures. The same difficulty is in evidence in the New Institutional Economics,
where the mainstream literature concedes the critical importance of informal and
cultural institutions, but has thus far failed to develop an adequate theory of the
informal. This recognized weakness is all the more urgent because of the
growing emphasis on governance, participation and social learning evident in
European rural development policy and practice. A clear understanding of the
opportunities and pitfalls that arise in working with informal institutions is
required, and therefore theories that provide analytical and operational traction in
the ‘parallel’ realities of the formal and the informal.
This paper starts from the point of view that at the heart of the institutional
dilemma lies a difficulty in conceptualising the informal social structures in which
informal institutions are reproduced. A review of relevant bodies of theory is
presented; drawing on sociological network theory, perspectives on governance
and social capital, and new developments in the organisational and management
literature. These suggest some starting points for a theory of informal social
realities and the institutions that structure them. The paper concludes with a
presentation of a theoretical framework for understanding informal structures in
rural development in terms of networks and communities.
To sort out
New structure, as follows:
Introduction: State of the art in NIE, relationship with other NIEs, relationship to
policy and practice, setup problematique
Informal institutions: introduce concepts, justify inst/organisations &
formal/informal distinctions, fitness
2Introduction
Institutions are widely considered an important analytical category in
understanding rural development (eg Roy & Tisdell, 1998; Scoones, 1998; Mehta
et al, 1999; Vorley, 2002), broadly defined as the processes of change that can
be observed in rural economy and society, and institutional change has
traditionally been seen as a key entry point for fostering the capacity of
communities and organisation to engage positively with rural development
(Korten, 1980; Uphoff, 1986; Murray & Dunn, 1995; DfID, 2003; SLIM, 2004).
Within this, the role of informal institutions and the relationship between formal
and informal relationships are often highlighted, yet there is some evidence that
for a high proportion of public policy actors, informal institutions are either
perceived negatively or dismissed as irrelevant (High et al, 2004c; High et al,
2006 forthcoming).
In research on social learning in environmental management in Europe, for
example, formal institutional frameworks have been highlighted as key barriers to
the social learning approach (Ison et al, 2004). Reading between the lines it is
the disparity between formally constituted rules and procedures in rural
governance and the cultural mechanisms available to local policy actors at the
catchment scale that causes the difficulty. Similar tensions can be observed in
work on endogenous development in Hungary during the accession process
(Nemes, 2004a; Nemes & High, 2005; Nemes et al, 2006 forthcoming) –
theorised as the tension between local, heuristic forms of governance and the
central, administrative systems of national and European government.
The practical impediments to understanding informal institutions are paralleled by
the recognised difficulty within the new institutional economics in taking the
informal onto
within the new institutional economics (NIE) literature at least, there is a
recognised deficiency in understanding them.
While there are other academic traditions that may have more to offer in terms of
understanding the informal the difficulties for the NIE in dealing with the realm of
the informal are reflected in many policy and management settings.
The underlying difficulty seems to be that the domain of the informal is either
considered too complex to take into account or nothing more than a source of
corruption and inefficiency, requiring management and control. These concerns
are addressed directly elsewhere (High et al, 2004c; High & Nemes, 2005; High
et al, 2006 forthcoming). Here, we seek to establish a framework through which
the informal can be better understood. The challenge is to provide enough
structure to gain analytical grip on informal institutions within policy and
organisational settings, while avoiding the trap of becoming so theoretically
complex or far removed from practice and experience as to be irrelevant. The
robustness of the framework lies primarily in that it is synthetic – it draws together
a number of existing academic traditions and builds on the commonalities.
However it has also been applied in research on adaptive capacity in the UK
rural sector, where it was tested with policymakers, public managers and local
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rural development (High & Pelling, 2004; High et al, 2004a; 2004b; Pelling &
High, 2005). The paper concludes by pointing to some future steps which could
be taken to develop the understanding of the informal within both NIE and rural
development practice.
The new institutionalism
“The study of institutions is one of the most enduring interests in the
social sciences. Like all human interests, there has been an ebb and
flow – but for the past two decades, we have witnessed a flow of a
very high volume. All the major disciplines – anthropology,
economics, political science, psychology, and sociology – have
become engaged and, as we would expect, each has given its
particular thrust and contour to the current. Indeed, recent work has
displayed almost as much diversity of definitions and interests within
as among disciplines.”
(Scott & Meyer, 1994: 55)
Institutions have been a matter of considerable interest to scholars of the social
sciences for the whole of the twentieth century, during which we saw at least one
major reinvention (leading to a distinction between old and new institutionalism).
Thus, although an interest in institutions per se was well established in the early
part of the century hay (Hay, 2002), it has been renewed over the last 30 years
or so through the development of new institutional approaches to fields such as
economics, political science, public administration, sociology and natural
resource management (Lowndes, 1996; Jordan & O'Riordan, 1997; Hay, 2002;
Vandenberg, 2002).
Institutional approaches to economics have moved on from a mentality of ‘getting
the prices right ’, to one of ‘getting the institutions right ’, when seeking to explain
economic questions such as why some countries are richer than others (Boettke,
1998). Yet the field that has emerged around these questions in economics
shares an incompleteness and a pluralism of approach with the new
institutionalisms in other fields (Williamson, 2000). Some theorists have
attempted a synthesis or at least a dialogue between different strands of
institutionalism, seeking unification of the variety of theoretical positions within
their field (eg Hall & Taylor, 1996; Vandenberg, 2002), or more rarely across the
broad swathe of social sciences (Scott & Meyer, 1994). However, others hold
that such a synthesis is undesirable (Hay & Wincott, 1998) or impossible (Jordan
& O'Riordan, 1997), given the disparity in underlying assumptions and definitions.
A key distinction in the literature is between organisations and institutions,
something that is not always evident (eg Uphoff, 1986). In this paper, following
North (1990), and Ostrom (1999), we define institutions as the rules, norms and
strategies which shape individual and organisational behaviour (eg North, 1990;
Ostrom, 1999). In contrast, organisations are the social structures that embody
agency – they are purposeful. North (1990: 3-10) explains the distinction as that
between the ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘players of the game’. While Kiser &
4Ostrom (1982: 193) justify the distinction on account of the problems of confusion
between ideal types and given instances of organisations that is thereby
circumvented, North uses it because of the analytical clarity that it enables – in
his case an explanation of why economies do not evolve as neo-classical
economists might expect.
We find the distinction useful, because it highlights the role of both formal and
informal institutions as something other than organisational forms, even in a
broader sense of an organisation than solely formally constituted systems of
actors. The institutional pressures that shape agency in any particular concrete
situation could be experienced as having degrees of formality or informality by
different actors, and those experiences could differ significantly for quite
legitimate reasons. By focussing on institutions as distinct from organisations,
we disassociate our analysis from particular actors (individuals or organisations),
and thus emphasise the point of this paper – that there are a range of influences
in decision-making which can be observed in the patterns of behaviour of rural
development actors, but which are not necessarily explicit in their public
explanations of their actions.
It should be noted that institutions do not operate in isolation – they reinforce or
counter one another – and thus one can speak of institutional architectures
(Pelling & High, 2005) or systems of institutions. Both reinforcement and
opposition are possible from given viewpoints, because institutions can have
both negative and positive connotations. For example, institutions can not be
read in a solely negative sense as constraints. As Nelson and Nelson (2002)
point out, they enable as well as constrain – institutions are the points of
reference which allow human co-operation. They are based in negotiation and
ongoing relationships, and indeed some of the interest in them amongst
economists is how they explain how humans escape some of the negative
outcomes in human interactions predicted by simple games theory, and how they
operate to lower transaction costs within groups and between individuals (Kiser &
Ostrom, 1982).
Nonetheless, institutions are not an unalloyed social good. North traces the
movement of his thought from a focus on institutions as determinants of
economic performance grounded in efficiency, to an understanding that
institutions arise primarily through negotiations governed by power relationships
(North, 1990). He sees the shaping of institutions by the powerful as the
explanation for the long-term persistence of institutional regimes that are not
socially optimal: “Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be
socially efficient; rather they or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the
interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (ibid:16).
Formal and informal institutions
While the new institutional approaches to economic behaviour can claim some
successes such as a coherent explanation for the existence of the firm as an
organisational form (Williamson, 1986; , 2000), and the path dependency of the
development trajectories of nations (North, 1990), these are primarily at the
5macro level. The institutional behaviour of individuals is still poorly understood
(Rizzello & Turvani, 2002), along with the informal institutions that shape
interactions at the micro level. We argue that this is in part due to the curious
inability of new institutional economics to get to grips with informal institutions
(High et al, 2004c). It is not a matter of a lack of recognition of the informal, or
even a lack of appreciation of them. The difficulty seems more deep-seated, and
perhaps to do with the limitations of the characteristic analytical and
methodological tools that economists tend to employ.
While not formally constituted, such institutions have a social reality and
legitimacy beyond simple ‘habits or preferences’ (Lowndes, 1996: 193). North, for
example, is clearly aware of the central role of informal institutions, and
particularly of those underpinning cultural values. For example, he says he has
no explanation for the success of the movement which abolished the slave trade
(North, 1990: 85), which does not at least include changes in ideas and values.
There is something more at work in economic development and human society
than rational human self-interest (see Frank, 2004 for a much fuller discussion of
this point). It is perhaps because of this openness to socially constructed,
culturally derived institutions that Vandenberg (2002) suggests North’s work
marks the beginning of a reconciliation between neoclassical economics and the
‘…socialised actions of modern sociology”.
However, while the existence of informal institutions is well established within the
new institutional literature (Lowndes, 1996: 183; North, 1990, chapter 5; Ostrom,
1999), there is considerable uncertainty about how they come into existence,
how they change and on the nature of the relationship between formal and
informal institutions (North, 2001; Rizzello and Turvani, 2002; Williamson, 2000).
Indeed it is not unfair to say that in much of the economically oriented new
institutional literature, informal institutions are problematic. So while North (1990,
chapter 5) states that the majority of institutions are informal and is clearly
interested in the long term effects of informal institutions on social and economic
trajectories, he has no adequate explanation of how they arise and change
(Lowndes, 1996: 187-8; Williamson, 2000).
Perhaps because of this, North and others such as Williamson (2000), tend to
treat culturally derived institutions as relatively permanent, changing only slowly if
at all, with the result that culture then becomes an exogenous variable (North,
1990:188), albeit an important one. This is reconised by Eggertsson (1996: 13)
who says, “…it is commonly believed that informal institutions, such as norms
and customs, change relatively slowly, and therefore, in studies involving
marginal changes in formal rules, informal institutions can often be taken for
granted.” However Eggertsson goes on to argue that this cannot hold in long
term analyses or where step changes in formal institutions occur. Formal and
informal institutions do not operate in isolation from one another – they are both
parts of the overall institutional architecture. They have different relevancy to
given decisions by given actors, and can act to modify one another in particular
situations. There is considerable eveidence for this, including some well
documented cases in topics such as coalition politics (Mershon, 1994), European
6Union governance and development (Olsen, 2002), and the transition of the
Central and Eastern European countries to democracy and market economics
(Gel'Man, 2004).
In the absence of a satisfactory understanding of informal institutions, North
(2001), Ostrom (1999) and others have focussed on formal institutions as a locus
of opportunity for change and reform. Some go further, presenting informal
institutions as purely a source of inertia and corruption (Lowndes, 1996: 188-9).
The difficulty of analysing informal institutions and the tendency to treat their
existence as a source of resistance, rather than a resource for change, is echoed
within the majority of the management literature (Shaw, 1997: 235). For
example, in the work of Argyris and Schön (1996), informal institutions are
recognised, but are still treated as a problem to be solved and tractable to top-
down management effort.
Research with rural policy makers in the UK and elsewhere reinforces the view
that it is difficult to reconcile the informal institutions with the formal rules and
procedures of civil servants, agency managers and other representatives of the
state (High et al, 2004b; High et al, 2004c; SLIM, 2004; High et al, 2006
forthcoming). That is not to say that there are not theoretical and methodological
traditions that attempt to foster practices that respect informal institutions: an
awareness of informal, embedded realities is present in the literature on
participation (Chambers, 1997) and policy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993), for example. However, the question is whether an approach
founded in the realities of rural development can ever be compatible with policy
and organisational contexts that have an inherent top-down bias. What is
required are traditions of understanding that make sense from the perspective of
managers and policy-makers and yet are suitably subversive to the view that the
role of decision-makers is to make and enforce decisions
Accounting for informal institutions is therefore not a simple matter of theoretical
tidiness. Adequate explanations of informal institutions are required in
understanding many kinds of rural development and change, from adaptation to
shocks and trends (High & Pelling, 2004; Pelling & High, 2005) to governance
and participation (High et al, 2006 forthcoming; Nemes et al, 2006 forthcoming).
An analytical framework that gave traction on informal institutions and their
relationship to the formal would represent progress over the current conditions,
especially if it were relevant to the situation and understanding of a variety of
rural actors. We suggest that there are two broad themes that appear across a
range of literature and which are therefore worth considering. These are
networks and communities, analytical categories that appear in different guises
and are sometimes concatenated. In the following sections a range of literature
which seems relevant to these concepts is examined, in order to draw out some
of the wider themes underpinning them within the social sciences.
Networks in sociology
The contribution of the sociological understanding of networks to the NIE has
been recognised as important, but an undeveloped part of the story (Williamson,
72000). Within the study of rural development, several strands of network
analysis can be discerned. According to Murdoch (2000: 408-9), network
approaches can be characterised as vertical – concerned primarily with links
between rural spaces and the wider agro-food sector – and horizontal –
concerned with the integration of the non-agricultural rural economy with a set of
spaces that straddle urban and rural spaces. This bears comparison with the
politico-spatial horizontal and vertical processes highlighted by Nemes (2004a;
2004b), something which is beyond the scope of this paper. Murdoch points to a
number of relevant traditions: commodity chains and actor-network theory in the
case of vertical networks, and network approaches to innovation and learning in
the case of horizontal networks. In this section we will add to that by considering
Granovetter’s sociological exploration of networks, and the applications of
networks to issues of governance.
An important contribution to the understanding of networks was made by
Granovetter (1973), who proposed that the analysis of social networks would be
an important tool for linking micro and macro sociological analysis. He concluded
that the “personal experience of individuals is closely bound up with larger-scale
aspects of social structure, well beyond the purview or control of particular
individuals” (ibid: 1377). His seminal work beings with an examination of the
“strength of ties”, and he distinguishes between strong ties founded in long
exposure, emotional intensity and the reciprocation of services, and weak ties
that are more ephemeral. Strong ties, in Granovetter’s thinking correlate well
with similarity of identity – strong ties are more likely to occur between similar
individuals (ibid: 1362), and are likely to lead over time to relational closure. The
result is clusters of strong ties between similar individuals, which we would
distinguish as a process of community building.
What established Granovetter as a leading sociologist of networks was his weak
tie hypothesis: That where a relationship serves as a ‘bridge’ between different
parts of a network (that is a unique link between different parts of a network, at
least locally), the bridge is always a weak tie. The significance of this is that weak
ties are critically important in the diffusion of information and influence:
“Intuitively speaking, this means that whatever is to be diffused can
reach a larger number of people, and traverse a greater social
distance…when passed through weak ties rather than strong. If one
tells a rumour to all his close friends, and they do likewise, many will
hear the rumour to all his close friends, and they do likewise, many
will hear the rumour a second and third time, since those linked by
strong ties tend to share friends. If the motivation to spread the
rumour is dampened a bit on each wave of retelling, then the rumour
moving through strong ties is much more likely to be limited to a few
cliques than that going via weak ones; bridges will not be crossed.”
(Granovetter, 1973: 1366)
From this we observe that identity is presented as crucial to the clustering of
relationships, and that weak ties operate to break down the barriers to
information flows that arise from the closure of strong relationships.
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An area in which the importance of networks to rural development is increasingly
being recognised, and which arguably builds on the work of Granovetter, is the
study of new forms of governance (Cheshire et al, 2006 forthcoming). In this
field, three modes of social co-ordination are often distinguished: network,
hierarchy and market. The collaborative nature of networks is often contrasted
with the directive role of bureaucratic hierarchies and the competitive activities of
markets. The inclusion of networks amongst governance types can be seen as
an extension to policy and social co-ordination of Granovetter’s (1985) critique of
Williamson’s (1975) typology of economic action, based solely on market and
hierarchy. In other words, accepting that the modes of interaction that determine
political and social action are embedded in context, history and personal
relationships in the same way that Granovetter argues economic activity is.
Much of the literature on network governance, particularly that in public
administration (cf Berry et al, 2004: 548), skates over the contradiction
immediately revealed in phrases such as ‘network management’ and ‘network
manager’. The contradiction is that the roots of associational activity are
personal relationships rather than formal roles, and that networks can be
distinguished from hierarchy through their informal mode of self-organisation (see
Thompson, 2004: 414-7, for a review of recent thinking on self-organisation in
networks). Another way of looking at this contradiction is in terms of the
difference between policies that attempt to direct informal networks to flourish,
and policies that are designed to allow informal networks to flourish. The
literature on participatory development is particularly critical of top-down efforts to
direct bottom up development (eg Cooke & Kothari, 2002) .
As we have said above, the contradiction is also evident in practice, and this may
explain why empirical studies of partnerships and network governance, which
have largely focused on formal networks, have surfaced so many difficulties
(Huxham, 1996). Troublesome themes such as lack of access, failures to build
and sustain trust, undemocratic processes, non-accountability, inequality and
power imbalances are apparent. What this has in common with the literature on
participation is that while in theory the focus is on informal, embedded
relationships, the practices they nourish often concentrate on the creation of
formal ly constituted structures, supported by externally resourced change agents
operating under de-personalised professional standards.
Thus, although the new institutionalists would agree with Roy & Tisdell (1998)
that good governance depends on appropriate institutions, the question is
whether an approach founded in policy and organisational contexts that have an
inherent top-down bias can ever be comfortable and competent when it comes to
network governance? An important question about network governance is that,
given the long history of interest in the topic under various guises, why are
attention and resources so often directed towards creating governance structures
that operate under similar canonical institutions to those that already exist, and
which are perceived to be inadequate? Perhaps it is simply the case that given
9an existing repertoire of institutional strategies, the natural inclination is to
continue to use them in any new domain.
Another explanation is that the fear of corruption or even the perception of
corruption makes the informal undiscussable. The risk that private interests may
affect the performance of public roles (Lowndes, 1996: 188), seems in many
formal contexts to engender a social frame (sensu Goleman, 1998: 195-234) that
silences any meaningful reference to shadow networks. So, while it is true many
illegal and illicit networks operate in the shadows in antagonism to public and
social interests (McIllwain, 1999; Raab & Milward, 2003), does this contaminate
all network activity in practice? High et al (2006 forthcoming) suggests not,
providing a counter-example of ethical action in the informal an institutional
environment where the possibility of corruption is well recognised.
Drawing on this examination of governance, we therefore suggest that progress
on understanding the conditions that shape rural development depends on a
change in thinking about the informal, institutionalised in such a way as to allow
organisational actors to bring their social skills to bear on their formal roles.
Therefore traditions of understanding and practice that make sense from the
perspective of managers and policy-makers are required, which are nevertheless
suitably subversive to the view that the role of decision-makers is to make and
enforce decisions. That is not to say that formal structures are or should be
unnecessary. Instead we propose that a deeper understanding of the
interactions between formal and informal institutions, will enable a more effective
understanding of governance, and will support more effective practice amongst
policy actors and public administrators (2006 forthcoming).
Social capital
A possible candidate tradition in which the informal is recognised, and which has
begun to be used in policy delivery and public management practice is social
capital (Baron et al, 2000). It has attracted policy attention from many of the
organisations funding rural development programmes including the likes of the
World Bank (Harriss, 1997), the UK government (Ashley & Carney, 1999;
Carney, 2002; PIU, 2002), and a range of civil society actors such as CARE
(Carney, 2002) and IIED (Bebbington, 1999). Theoretical expositions of social
capital and the practices they purport to support have been strongly critiqued
(Fine, 2001). Yet there remains considerable potential for a more critical
engagement with informal institutions through the language and ideas of social
capital (Pelling, 1998; Pelling & High, 2005).
Social capital has been defined as the ‘features of social life – networks, norms
and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue
shared objectives’ (Putnam, 1995: 664-5). The interpersonal relationships that
give form to social capital and are a site and outcome of reciprocity can be
categorised in bonding, bridging and linking capital. Bonding capital is shared
between individuals with similar socioeconomic characteristics, and typifies the
relationships within ethnic, class or religious groups. Bridging capital describe
less dense social networks, particularly associations between people with shared
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interests or goals but contrasting social backgrounds. Linking capital, like
bridging capital cross group boundaries but in this case signifies a vertical
relationship for example between social classes (Putnam, 2000).
The balance between bridging, bonding and linking capital points to a society’s
orientation towards social fragmentation, cooperation or hierarchy. Strong
bonding ties are associated more with survival than with development. They are
essentially conservative, accruing when individuals withdraw from maintaining
associations with the wider society and turn to close-nit groups. This reduces the
exposure of group members to perceived external risks, but also tends to
reinforce views that other groups and the wider society cannot be trusted in
social or economic exchange, leading to a fragmentation of society, slowing
down the flow of information and undermining collective action. Olson (1982)
argued that societies characterised by bonding capital exhibit interest group
politics, lobbying and cartel economics.
It has been argued that bridging capital enables social collaboration through its
wide array of loose associations (Putnam et al, 1993), a point that echoes
Granovetter’s weak ties hypothesis. Bridging capital acts as a network for the
communication of a participant’s reputation, creating an incentive for
trustworthiness and reciprocity. In studies of networking by managers, Burt
(1997, 1998) has shown that strong communal ties can prevent different groups
coming together for a common cause. He argues that whilst individuals with large
networks will have more social capital, how one is positioned within an
organisation’s fields of formal and informal relationship can be just as important.
When gaps appear in the communication channels between different parts of an
organisation ‘structural holes’ open. Individuals able to network to bridge these
holes will have utilised social ties effectively and so have more social capital.
The third capital, offers a potential distinction concerning informal relationships
which opens up issues of power, patronage and corruption. According to Pelling
& High (2005), societies rich in linking capital benefit from active pathways for
facilitating the transfer of goods and information up and down the social
hierarchy, but are liable to have difficulties in maintaining social trust and
cooperation. In unequal patron-client relationships clients have the opportunity to
leverage resources from the hierarchy. Rose’s (2000) discussion of the Russian
concept of ‘blatt’ is a good illustration of this, where individuals with a good
reputation and a wide array of social contacts are able to circumvent
cumbersome formal procedures for accessing goods and information. But this is
at the cost of limited scope to impose sanctions on patrons opening up
relationships to exploitation and dependency. Thus the hierarchical relations
underpinning linking capital are as useful for top-down social control as they are
for delivering social development.
Existing networks of social capital can act as a cultural memory, as the
embodiment of past successes at collaboration or of descents into fragmentation
and dependency. This can provide a ready template for future cooperation, but
also a barrier to interventions that require a reconfiguring of social capital ties
and networks. If building developmentally positive stocks of social capital
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requires the reordering of an individual’s social ties, this will always be set
against the resilience of established links embedded as they are in history and
habit. Thus working with social capital requires emotional intelligence (Goleman,
1996) on the part of individuals, and formal institutions that incentivise it on the
part of organisations involved in rural development (High, 2005).
Finally, social capital highlights the role of trust in social relationships (Pelling &
High, 2005). Trust has been defined as:
“The expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and
cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms on the part of
other members of that community.”
Fukuyama (1995: 26)
Embedded in this definition is the notion that trust not only exists when it is
enacted, but that individuals and societies can build institutions that are more or
less conducive to the surfacing of trusting relationships. This affirms the link to
the new institutional economics, where institutions are held to cut down
transaction costs, and enable modelling of other actor’s decision strategies (Kiser
& Ostrom, 1982).
In his most recent writing Putnam (2000) has shifted emphasis from trust to
reciprocity. Trust reinforces norms of generalised reciprocity, but reciprocity is a
social attribute through which trust is enacted in interpersonal transfers of
information or resources. Reciprocity is differentiated into balanced and
generalised forms. Balanced reciprocity takes place between two individuals
who, perhaps routinely, exchange gifts of a roughly equal value (friends or
neighbours exchanging holiday gifts). Generalised reciprocity is less direct, an
individual might help another without expecting anything in return but rather in
the knowledge that a third party will be predisposed towards extending help
knowing the reputation of the first individual for generosity and helpfulness.
General reciprocity relies on the propagation of reputation and the threat of its
withdrawal as a social sanction against free riding behaviour (Putnam et al,
1993).
Thus from social capital we see an affirmation of the two broad qualities of
relationship observed by Granovetter. Bonding capital loosely correlates to the
operation of strong ties – forming and holding together tight communities of
similar individuals. Bridging and linking capital generally operate through weak
ties, though not all bonding ties can be described as ‘strong’ and neither are
bridging ties necessarily ‘weak’. The capacity of individuals to change the
orientation and complexion of their social ties gives social capital a dynamic
quality Leonard and Onyx (2003). There is strong disagreement about the
opportunities available for intervention to foster social capital. (Ostrom, 2000),
for eg argues that social capital is hard to construct through external intervention,
whereas (Fox, 1996) argues that while social capital can spontaneously emerge,
it almost certainly needs assistance from outside actors in order to survive. The
focus on trust in the social capital literature highlights its importance as a basic
explanatory variable within informal institutions, and perhaps points to some
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methodological integrities that need to be respected when engaging with the
informal.
The informal in management studies
Finally, we turn to the management literature where a growing potential for
responding to the informal can be perceived within theory and methodology
developed in two schools of thought: (i) communities of practice (Brown &
Duguid, 1991; Wenger, 1999; Lesser et al, 2000), and complexity science
perspectives on management (Shaw, 1997; Stacey et al, 2000; Shaw, 2002).
What these approaches have in common is that they start from the
understanding that informal relationships are essential to the operation of
organisations and challenge top-down thinking about them. It is observed that
shadow systems (after Shaw, 1997)of informal, social relationships permeate
canonical organisations (sensu Brown & Duguid, 1991) and are a critical source
of adaptive and operational capacity. It is further argued that if an organisation is
to maximise benefit from shadow networks, management in relation to shadow
networks is a more appropriate stance than attempted management of the
shadow networks.
For Wenger and Shaw, communities of practice and shadow networks arise in
response to shared challenges and evolve with their own rhythm and life.
Community members may come and go (Wenger, 1999: 99), but the community
of practice will live on or perish according to its own inherent dynamics. Thus
Wenger (2000a), asserts that informal organisational structures such as
communities of practice cannot be shaped by management effort, constructing
them in terms of their response to organisational change rather than submission
to it. Shaw (2002), too challenges the assumption that organisational dynamics
are the product of intentional dynamics and that the ‘gap’ between formal and
informal organisations is something to be bridged and controlled. Instead, she
embraces the informal as a locus of opportunity for change, where new
opportunities arise through engagement and conversation. The challenge is not
so much one of how to drive change, but how to participate in the way that things
change over time (ibid: 172). This requires “conceptual ability brought to bear on
the large-scale combined with individual skills of communication exercised at the
small scale.” (Stacey, 2001: 234).
Thus we propose that the institutional architecture of rural development
encompasses exactly those informal spaces in which local culture is expressed,
and inverts the usual view that the problem is to bring unmanaged spaces within
management control. Instead, it needs to be recognised that unmanaged spaces
are pervasive and enable the ongoing operation of individuals and organisations
even within highly formalistic institutional contexts. Thus the skills that local
agents use to navigate unmanaged spaces overlap those that organisational
actors require to make canonical institutions work. That is not to say that formal
structures are or should be unnecessary. Instead it is proposed that a deeper
understanding of the interactions between formal and informal institutions,
between the canonical and the shadow systems, will enable a more effective
understanding of rural development.
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For Wenger, practice is constructed as a shared activity with a history and a
culture of its own. A community of practice is a group characterised by such a
practice, though not all groups with shared activities are communities of practice
- some being too large or too ephemeral or not coherent enough and so on. It is
intrinsically associated with identity, and the overlapping of identities though
multiple memberships of different communities of practice is an important
explanation of how different communities relate. Wenger develops this idea in
terms of ‘constellations of practice’ (Wenger, 1999: 126-31), which are
configurations of relationships that contain discontinuities which suggest they are
not coherent enough to be considered communities, but which include several
(perhaps overlapping) communities of practice.
Conclusions: A theoretical framework for the informal
In conclusion, we suggest that understanding organisations and the institutions
that shape them is a key part of understanding rural development. It seems
reasonable to extend this analysis beyond the formal institutions that are most
visible in public life, and look at those forms which interpenetrate them and
enable them to work. Drawing together the discussion above, we suggest that a
framework for understanding institutional architectures (systems of interlocking
institutions) can be constructed around two common social patterns of
organisation: communities and networks. These can be characterised in terms of
the different qualities of relationships that they sustain, and the institutions that
they entail.
We define communities as groups of people who are perceived in terms of a
shared identity. This includes communities of place and culture, but also
communities of practice, whose identity is derived from share activities. Shared
identity is expressed in similar interests and shared values, and therefore the
important institutions in a community are likely to include shared understandings
of what the community is and what membership entails. These tend to have a
taken for granted quality, and it can be threatening to question them. Thus
community bonds tend to be quite tight, as with bonding social capital. The
negative side of this is that they can be exclusionary, and non-membership of
such communities can give rise to ill feeling between insiders and outsiders.
Wenger’s work though, points to a way out of this, through his examination of
multiple membership and overlapping identity.
Community boundaries do not necessarily reproduce those of the formal
organisational contexts in which they occur, and thus communities tend to arise
through mutual engagement rather than management fiat. As strong ties grow
through repeated exposure, it is perhaps possible to enable the development of
communities where they are considered desirable, through making time for
individuals to interact. They are a potential resource for rural development,
because shared interests and similar worldviews make negotiating and endorsing
plans and reactions quicker and easier. Having said that, much of the recent
literature on participatory development warns against making simplistic
assumptions about shared identity and shared interest in communities (Guijt &
Kaul Shah, 1998).
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Thus communities give an organisational unit of analysis in accord with
individuals’ own perceived interests. As with any form of organisation, they have
different facets and there can be disagreement even within their membership
over their shared identity and boundaries. Also membership is not necessarily
mutually exclusive, and communities overlap, giving a dense texture to social
architecture. But because of their conservative nature, they can also close down
opportunities for change. Therefore it is also worth investigating a more open
social form, the network.
Networks arise in social life across boundaries of difference. Thus unlike
communities, common interest is not assumed, but instead is negotiated.
Networks are essentially artefacts of a requirement for co-ordination. Although
networks do not create and maintain a shared identity amongst their members
(or if they do, we would consider them to be more akin to communities as we
have defined them), they do have their own identity, arising through the
regularities in their qualities, history and trajectories. Without a taken for granted
basis in common interest, networks perhaps less likely to give rise to formal
organisational forms than communities, with any co-ordinated action being more
transitory.
Networks are also less dense than communities, and this together with their
more ephemeral nature may be their weakness. They are a site of bridging
social capital, linking together organisations and communities. The encounter
with different values and worldviews that occurs through networks makes
engagement in networks a signif icant opportunity for learning, and hence a key
site of interest in rural development. The informal institutions that shape
networks are key to understanding the mediating relationships that enable
integrated rural development (sensu Nemes, 2005; sensu Nemes & High, 2005)
It may be that operating as an individual in a network requires a different skill-set
to working within a community. With their basis in relationships between
individuals, there is a danger that forcing networks into existence will result in a
paper exercise or a locus of discontent. However, we suspect that there is much
that can be done from a management perspective to foster networks. Having
said that there is also an opportunistic quality to networks and opportunities to
create and maintain networks arise wherever relationships can be established
across difference:
What both networks and communities have in common is that they are founded
in relationships of trust. Within a community, trust arises from shared interest and
on-going engagement. In a network, trust is required in order to negotiate a
mutual interest, and arises through ongoing engagement. Trust may be harder to
establish through a network relationship, although there is plenty of evidence to
suggest that networks successfully rely on institutions of trust and the transitivity
of trust to operate. Trust can be invested in individuals and expressed in personal
relationships. However, it can also arise through institutions, arising from the
social contracts embedded in formal organisational forms, and the general and
specific reciprocity engendered by prevailing cultural frames.
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While networks and communities are interesting in their own right, it is in
combination that we suggest they prove a powerful analytical tool – providing
purchase on the informal institutions and relationships of the informal, as well as
the more visible formal organisational realities of rural development.
Communities provide a powerful focus of social energy and resilience, but
without the linking function provided by networks they risk becoming isolated
from the broad pool of human experiences and learning in which tomorrow’s
solutions to emerging issues might be found. Networks on the other are perhaps
too diffuse, failing to provide an adequate basis for organised action, except in
circumstances where the need to do so overrides the transaction costs involved
in negotiating across different interests.
This suggests to us that institutional architectures should be analysed in terms of
the articulation between communities and networks, and between the formal and
the informal aspects of social life. Changes in adaptive capacity and
opportunities for adaptive action are more likely to be picked up through such a
lens than if only part of the social fabric is visible. A systemic analysis of adaptive
capacity should therefore asks questions about different kinds of institutions and
relationships, seeking points of common ground as a starting point.
As a concept, trust offers one locus of intersection between communities of
network, and its importance within both types of social structure points to its
central role in organisation and intentional action for adaptive capacity. A more
subtle unifying principle is the understanding that networks and communities are
not fixed categories, but that institutions and sets of social relationships change
over time and between different viewpoints. Grasping this requires a flexibility of
understanding and a willingness to appreciate different viewpoints.
Something about tying together the logics of networks – refer to Thompson
(Thompson, 2003), chapter 4 in particular and the difficulties of understanding
the logic of networks.
This framework helps resolve it. Lets hypothesise that exchange works through
networks, and that co-indentification works within communities. This explains
why it si so damn difficult to unpick the rump of gifting – we need to look at the
sorts of relationships that support gifting.
Also Wenger gives a way out of the weak link hypothesis – obviously still
important, but the assumption of unity of identity is undermined, and multiple
membership of communities of practice breaks down the assumption that strong
ties transmute. Some of the difficulty os to do with the way that he quasi-defines
strong ties.
16
References
Argyris, C. & Schön, D. (1996). Organisational learning II - Theory, learning
and practice. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc.
Ashley, C. & Carney, D. (1999). Sustainable livelihoods: Lessons from early
experience. London, Department for International Development.
Baron, S., Field, J. & Schuller, T., Eds. (2000). Social capital: Critical
perspectives. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Berry, F.S., Brower, R.S., Choi, S.O., Gao, W.X.F., Jang, H.S., Kwon, M. &
Word, J. (2004). Three traditions of network research: What the public
management research agenda can learn from other research communities
in Public Administration Review 64(5): 539-552.
Boettke, P.J. (1998). Is there an intellectual market niche for Austrian
economics? in Review of Austrian Economics 11: 1-4.
Brown, J.S. & Duguid, P. (1991). Organizational learning and communities of
practice: Towards a unified view of working, leaning and innovation in
Organization Science 2(1): 40-57.
Carney, D. (2002). Sustainable livelihoods approaches: Progress and
possibilities for change. London, Department for International Development.
Cheshire, L., Higgins, V. & Lawrence, G., Eds. (2006 forthcoming). International
Perspectives on Rural Governance: New Power Relations in Rural
Economies and Societies
Abingdon, Routledge.
Cooke, B. & Kothari, U., Eds. (2002). Participation: The new tyranny? London,
Zed Books.
DfID (2003). Promoting institutional and organisational development. DfID
Issues, No. 1861925352, Department for International Development, London.
Eggertsson, T. (1996). A note on the economics of institutions in Alston, L. J.,
Eggertsson, T. & North, D. C., Eds. Empirical studies in institutional change.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 6-24.
Fine, B. (2001). Social capital versus social theory: Political economy and
social science at the turn of the millennium. London, Routledge.
Fox, J. (1996). How does civil society thicken? The political construction of
social capital in rural Mexico in World Development 24(6): 1089-1103.
Frank, R.H. (2004). What price the moral high ground? : ethical dilemmas in
competitive environments. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press.
Gel'Man, V. (2004). The unrule of law in the making: the politics of informal
institution building in Russia in Europe-Asia Studies 56(7).
Goleman, D. (1996). Emotional intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ.
London, Bloomsbury Publishing.
Goleman, D. (1998). Vital lies, simple truths. London, Bloomsbury Publishing.
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties in The American Journal of
Sociology 78(6): 1360-1380.
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem
of embeddedness in The American Journal of Sociology 91(3): 481-510.
17
Guijt, I. & Kaul Shah, M., Eds. (1998). The myth of community: Gender issues
in participatory development. London, ITDG Publishing.
Hall, P.A. & Taylor, R.C.R. (1996). Political science and the three New
Institutionalisms in Political Studies 44: 936-957.
Hay, C. & Wincott, D. (1998). Structure, agency and historical
institutionalism in Political Studies 46(5): 951-957.
Hay, C. (2002). Political analysis: A critical introduction. Basingstoke,
Palgrave.
High, C. & Pelling, M. (2004). Understanding adaptive capacity to rapid
climate change: Drawing on theories of social and organisational learning.
Rapid climate change project working paper, No. 3, University of Liverpool,
Liverpool.
High, C., Pelling, M. & Dearing, J. (2004a). Adaptation to climate change:
Grasshoppers and resilience. Rapid climate change case study, No. 2, Kings
College London, London.
High, C., Pelling, M. & Dearing, J. (2004b). Exploring responses to rapid
climate change in Wales. Rapid climate change case study, No. 1, University
of Liverpool, Liverpool.
High, C., Pelling, M. & Rengasamy, S. (2004c). Local agency, adaptation and
the shadow system: The institutional architecture of social learning in rural
areas of the UK and India. XI World Congress of Rural Sociology, Trondheim,
Norway
High, C. (2005). Fried eggs and phronesis: ICTs and social learning in rural
development XXI European Congress of Rural Sociology. Keszthely, Hungary.
High, C. & Nemes, G. (2005). Evaluating rural development: Mediating social
learning within LEADER XXI European Congress of Rural Sociology.
Keszthely, Hungary.
High, C., Slater, R. & Rengasamy, S. (2006 forthcoming). Are shadows dark?
Governance, informal institutions and corruption in rural India in Cheshire,
L., Higgins, V. & Lawrence, G., Eds. International Perspectives on Rural
Governance: New Power Relations in Rural Economies and Societies.
Abingdon, Routledge.
Huxham, C., Ed. (1996). Creating collaborative advantage. London, Sage
Publications.
Ison, R., Steyaert, P., Roggero, P.P., Hubert, B. & Jiggins, J. (2004). Social
learning for the integrated management and sustainable use of water at
catchment scale SLIM final report, Open Un iversity, Milton Keynes.
Jordan, A. & O'Riordan, T. (1997). Social institutions and climate change:
Applying cultural theory to practice. Working paper, No. GEC 97-15,
CSERGE, University of East Anglia, Norwhich.
Kiser, L.L. & Ostrom, E. (1982). The three worlds of action: A metatheoretical
synthesis of institutional approaches in Ostrom, E., Ed. Strategies of
political enquiry. London, Sage: 179-222.
Korten, D.C. (1980). Community organizations and rural development: A
learning process approach in Public administration review
(September/October 1980): 480 - 511.
18
Lesser, E.L., Fontaine, M.A. & Slusher, J.A., Eds. (2000). Knowledge and
Communities. Oxford, Butterworth Heinemann.
Lowndes, V. (1996). Varieties of New Institutionalism: A critical appraisal in
Public Administration 74: 181-197.
McIllwain, J.S. (1999). Organized crime: A social network approach in Crime,
law and social change 32(4): 301-323.
Mehta, L., Leach, M., Newell, P., Scoones, I., Sivaramakrishnan, K. & Way, S.-A.
(1999). Exploring understandings of institutions and uncertainty: New
directions in natural resource management. IDS discussion paper, No. 372,
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
Mershon, C.A. (1994). Expectations and informal rules in coalition formation
in Comparative Political Studies 27(1): 40-79.
Murdoch, J. (2000). Networks - a new paradigm of rural development? in
Journal of rural studies 16(4): 407-419.
Murray, M. & Dunn, L. (1995). Capacity building for rural development in the
United States in Journal of rural studies 11(1): 89-97.
Nelson, R.R. & Nelson, K. (2002). Technology, institutions and innovation
systems in Research Policy 31: 256-272.
Nemes, G. (2004a) Constructing rural development: Models, institutions,
policies and the Eastern enlargement PhD, Centre for the Rural Economy,
University of Newcastle, Newcastle.
Nemes, G. (2004b). Integrated Rural Development, and the Reflexive Agency
- Theory and practice in a Hungarian pilot programme. XI World Congress of
Rural Sociology, Trondheim, Norway
Nemes, G. (2005). Integrated rural development: The concept and its
operation. Discussion Paper, No. MT-DP. 2005/6, Institute of Economics:
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.
Nemes, G. & High, C. (2005). Disintegration, the reason for policy failure: an
analytical model of integrated rural development XXI European Congress of
Rural Sociology. Keszthely, Hungary.
Nemes, G., High, C. & Huzair, F. (2006 forthcoming). Reflexive agency and
multi-level governance: mediating integrated rural development in South
Transdanubia in Cheshire, L., Higgins, V. & Lawrence, G., Eds. International
Perspectives on Rural Governance: New Power Relations in Rural
Economies and Societies. Abingdon, Routledge.
North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic
performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University of Press.
North, D.C. (2001). Needed: A theory of change in Meir, G. M. & Steigler, J. E.,
Eds. Frontiers of development economics: The future in perspective.
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 491.
Olsen, J.P. (2002). Reforming European institutions of governance in
Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 581-602.
Ostrom, E. (1999). Institutional Rational Choice in Sabatier, P. A., Ed.
Theories of the policy process. Boulder, Westview Press: 35-72.
19
Ostrom, E. (2000). Social capital: A fad or a fundamental concept in
Dasgupta, P. & Serageldin, I., Eds. Social capital: A multifaceted perspective.
Washington DC, The World Bank: 172-214.
Pelling, M. (1998). Participation, social capital and vulernability to urban
flooding in Guyana in Journal of International Development 10(4): 469-486.
Pelling, M. & High, C. (2005). Understanding adaptation: what can social
capital offer assessments of adaptive capacity? in Global Environmental
Change A On-line postprint.
PIU (2002). Social capital: A discussion paper. PIU Report, Performance and
Innovations Unit, Cabinet Office, London.
Putnam, R. (1995). Turning in, turning out: the strange disappearance of
social
capital in America in Political Science and Politics 28: 667-683.
Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. & Nanetti, R.Y. (1993). Making democracy work:
Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R.D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American
community. New York, Touchstone.
Raab, J. & Milward, H.B. (2003). Dark networks as problems in Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory 13(4): 413-439.
Rizzello, S. & Turvani, M. (2002). Subjective diversity and social learning: A
cognitive perspective for understanding institutional behaviour in
Constitutional Political Economy 13: 197-210.
Rose, R. (2000). Getting things done in an antimodern society: Social
capital networks in Russia in Dasgupta, P. & Serageldin, I., Eds. Social
capital: A multifaceted perspective. Washington DC, The World Bank: 147-
171.
Roy, K.C. & Tisdell, C.A. (1998). Good governance in sustainable
development: the impact of institutions in International Journal of Social
Economics 25(678): 1310-1325.
Scoones, I. (1998). Sustainable rural livelihoods: A framework for analysis.
Working paper, No. 72, Institute for Development Studies, Brighton.
Scott, W.R. & Meyer, J.W. (1994). Institutions and organisations: Towards a
theoretical synthesis in Scott, W. R., Ed. Institutional environments and
organizations. London, Sage: 55-80.
Shaw, P. (1997). Intervening in the shadow systems of organizations:
Consulting from a complexity perspective in Journal of Organizational
Change 10(3): 235-250.
Shaw, P. (2002). Changing conversations in organizations: A complexity
approach to change. London, Routledge.
SLIM (2004). Developing conducive and enabling institutions for concerted
action. Policy briefing, No. 3, Open University, Milton Keynes.
Stacey, R.D., Griffin, D. & Shaw, P. (2000). Complexity and management: Fad
or radical challenge to systems thinking. London, Routledge.
Thompson, G. (2003). Between hierarchies and markets : the logic and limits
of network forms of organization. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.
20
Thompson, G. (2004). Is all the world a complex network? in Economy and
Society 33(3): 411-424.
Uphoff, N. (1986). Local institutional development: An analytical sourcebook
with cases. West Hartford, Connecticut, Kumarian Press.
Vandenberg, P. (2002). North's institutionalism and the prospect of
combining theoretical approaches in Cambridge Journal of Economics
26(2): 217-235.
Vorley, B. (2002). Sustaining Agriculture: Policy, Governance, and the
Future of Family-based Farming. London, IIED.
Wenger, E. (1999). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning and
identity. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York, Free Press.
Williamson, O.E. (1986). Economic organization: firms, markets and policy
control. Brighton, Wheatsheaf.
Williamson, O.E. (2000). The new institutional economics: Taking stock,
looking ahead in Journal of Economic Literature 38(3): 595-613.
